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This Quick Guide provides a brief background to Australia’s preferential trade agreements (PTAs; often referred 
to as free trade agreements), in particular what they are, what they cover and commentary on whether they 
have been effective in increasing Australia’s wider economic welfare. 
What are Preferential Trade Agreements? 
A PTA is essentially a contract between two or more countries. Once ratified, a PTA is a legally binding treaty to 
liberalise access to the parties’ markets for goods, services and investment. 
At first glance, PTAs appear to go against a key principle of the multilateral trading system, the Most-Favoured 
Nation (MFN) principle. In brief, the MFN principle stipulates that a country cannot ordinarily discriminate 
between its trading partners. However, a closer look reveals that PTAs can be accommodated within the 
multilateral trading system, if they comply with the rules.   
Process of establishing a PTA 
The Australian Constitution enables the Executive Government to commit Australia to treaties at the 
international level. The conclusion of and accession to treaties is a matter for the government of the day in the 
exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth conferred by section 61 of the Constitution. 
The Federal Executive Council, established under section 62 of the Constitution, must approve Australia’s entry 
into treaties. The responsibility for making recommendations to the Executive Council with respect to the 
issuance of full powers, signature, accession, ratification, termination and amendment of treaties rests with the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Having become a party to a treaty, the government is then able to rely upon the 
external affairs power in section 51(xxix) of the Constitution, which enables Parliament to enact legislation that 
may otherwise be outside its legislative power. 
PTAs typically require implementing legislation, which must pass Parliament. This is often the stage at which the 
Parliament has the most significant input, after the negotiation process has already concluded. Most PTAs come 
into effect once both Australia and other parties to the agreement enact implementing legislation.  
The process by which a treaty enters into force, and the relationship between the powers of the Parliamentary 
and the Executive branch, can be complex. In addition to a current inquiry by the Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, the issue has been examined in: 
• a 1995 report, Trick or treaty: Commonwealth power to make and implement treaties, by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs and 
• a 2010 report by the Productivity Commission, Bilateral and regional trade agreements, which examined the 
decision making process for entering into negotiations, and when benefits are estimated. 
ISSN 2203-5249 
 
 
 
 
What areas do they ordinarily cover?  
Australia’s PTAs aim to remove or reduce tariffs and restrict the use of non-tariff barriers. They also typically 
address non-tariff related issues such as government procurement, competition policy and behind-the-border 
regulatory issues that may restrict trade. In brief, PTAs aim to facilitate trade by expanding access to new 
markets and expanding trade in existing markets for the parties involved.  
What are some of the most controversial areas covered by PTAs? 
Increasingly PTAs contain commitments on intellectual property, investor protection and movement of natural 
persons. These provisions tend to attract significant attention due to the economic and social impact they can 
have on a country’s domestic environment. 
Intellectual Property 
Most of Australia’s trade agreements go beyond the coverage of goods and services to cover areas such as 
intellectual property (IP). In essence, IP laws provide creators of certain works with monopoly rights. IP laws that 
are either too weak or too strong can adversely affect a country’s economy.  
Some of these agreements, including those with Singapore and Thailand, adhere to Australia’s commitments 
under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Others, such as the agreement with the United States and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement 
(currently under negotiation), go beyond Australia’s current commitment to include so-called ‘TRIPS-Plus’ 
provisions. TRIPS-Plus provisions place additional demands on countries, including the extension of 
pharmaceutical patents, to those required by the WTO.  
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade have made the argument that common approaches to IP can 
‘strengthen regional economic integration’ and promote ‘foreign investment, technology transfer and trade 
between the parties’ (p. 36-37). 
Critics such as Dr Philippa Dee from the Australian National University (ANU) have argued that TRIPS-Plus 
measures are ‘only a little bit concerned with providing additional incentives for new IP to be created that might 
not be otherwise. They are greatly concerned with expanding the ongoing transfers of economic rents from the 
consumers to the producers of IP that already exists (and hence needs no further incentives).’ 
The increased tendency by countries to enter into bilateral and mega-regional agreements, like the TPP, is 
resulting in the rise of so-called ‘trade bundling’. In brief, trade bundling is the offering of market access 
concessions by one country on a discriminatory basis in return for another country accepting a set of conditions 
including stronger rules of IP protection, such as those advocated by the US. 
In its 2010 report on trade agreements, the Productivity Commission noted that a country’s optimum design and 
level of IP protection ‘depends on the extent to which they are net importers or exporters of IP’ (p. 258). 
Australia is a net importer of IP, and this led the Productivity Commission to conclude that stronger IP laws 
similar to those agreed to under the Australia–US Trade Agreement impose a net cost on Australia. In her 
assessment of the impact of the Australia–US agreement, Dr Philippa Dee estimated that the IP provisions in 
that agreement could result in an annual net cost to Australia of up to $88 million. 
Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
In brief, an Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision is a ‘procedural mechanism’ that has the primary 
aim of protecting a foreign investor against a decision by a host government to expropriate its investments, 
including IP rights and assets, without fair compensation. 
Advocates of ISDS such as the United States Council for International Business argue that ISDS provisions can 
increase investment in the host country and potentially encourage the creation of a stable foreign investment 
regime. The inclusion of ISDS is particularly important, advocates argue, when dealing with developing countries 
with less robust legal and institutional frameworks. 
The Productivity Commission however, found that available evidence does not point to the existence in Australia 
of a market failure warranting the use of ISDS. There is evidence that while the inclusion of national treatment 
provisions (treating domestic and foreign companies equally) within trade and investment agreements has a 
positive impact on the flow of investment to the host country, the inclusion of ISDS does not. Further, ISDS 
provisions can give foreign investors privileges that are not available to domestic firms.  
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In Australia, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade considered a 2014 Bill that 
aimed to prevent the Australian Government from entering into trade and investment treaties that include ISDS 
provisions. While the Committee recommended that the Bill not be passed, the issue of ISDS attracted a 
significant degree of attention—the committee received over 11,000 emails from individuals opposing ISDS. 
At January 2014, more than 3,000 international treaties included ISDS provisions. The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported in April 2014 that the number of ISDS cases brought 
forward has increased from 5 in 1996 to 57 in 2013. Cases involving the US and the European Union account for 
75 per cent of all cases. This increase in the number of such cases has led to concerns about the ‘system 
deficiencies’ of the process. In brief, as has been noted by the UNCTAD in a June 2013 paper, some of the key 
areas of concern regarding the current system of ISDS include the following. 
• Lack of transparency, as many ISDS cases are heard behind closed doors: The lack of public access to 
proceedings has fuelled perceptions about the lack of legitimacy and transparency of such provisions. When 
cases do become public, there appears to be inconsistency and errors in decisions, including ‘divergent legal 
interpretations of identical or similar treaty provisions as well as differences in the assessment of the merits 
of cases involving the same facts’ (p. 3). 
• Cost and time need to resolve cases: Currently the average cost is around US$8 million per party, per case. 
ISDS cases take several years to conclude. Delays often occur because ‘large law firms, who dominate the 
field … employ expensive litigation techniques, which include intensive research on each arbitrator 
candidate, far-reaching and burdensome document discovery and lengthy arguments about the minutest 
case detail’ (p. 4). 
• The existence of loopholes permits foreign investors to ‘treaty shop’: As outlined in a 2012 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development working paper, treaty shopping refers to the practice whereby a 
foreign investor restructures its operations or establishes subsidiaries in host countries in order to obtain 
qualification for protections provided under investment and trade treaties that may be advantageous to their 
interests. 
In Australia, these concerns were echoed in the Productivity Commission’s 2010 report on Australia’s trade 
agreements. In that report, the Commission noted that ISDS provisions in essence shift political risks ordinarily 
associated with foreign direct investment from international businesses to elected governments. The report 
recommended that the Australian Government should ‘seek to avoid accepting provisions in trade agreements 
that confer additional substantive or procedural rights on foreign investors over and above those already 
provided by the Australian legal system’ (p. xxxii). 
The issue of whether countries such as Australia, with its well-functioning, respected and independent legal 
system, should be offering international businesses the opportunity to challenge the decisions of national courts, 
was also raised by the Chief Justice of the High Court in a 2014 conference paper. 
In light of the rise in the inclusion of ISDS provisions in international agreements and the increase in awareness 
of the risks and ‘systematic deficiencies’ of the process, the UNCTAD mapped five reforms to the system. Its 
proposals included, in the short-run, the promotion of alternative dispute resolution, the tailoring of the current 
system to increase transparency, and limiting investors’ access to ISDS. In the long-run, the aim would be to 
completely overhaul the system by replacing the current system of ad hoc tribunals with the establishment of a 
permanent international investment court. 
Movement of natural persons 
Chapters concerning rules about movement of natural persons can also be contentious. This is particularly the 
case if the requirement for sponsors under 457 class visas to undertake labour market testing has been 
weakened under a PTA. Labour market testing refers to the requirement imposed on businesses to ensure that 
there is no suitable worker in Australia to fill the position available before filling it with an overseas worker.  
Australia has made commitments not to apply labour market testing on some groups of skilled workers. For 
instance, under the recently signed Korea-Australia agreement, Australia has agreed that Korean nationals 
entering Australia on a temporary basis as service suppliers or investors will not be subjected to labour market 
testing. It is not as yet clear, however, who might be defined as a service supplier. Korea has retained its right to 
apply labour market testing for skilled Australian workers entering Korea. 
Critics of this policy argue the relationship between Australia’s trade commitments and immigration 
requirements lacks transparency and clarity and that there is not always a clear understanding of how Australia’s 
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commitments under PTAs translate to specific exemptions from labour market testing. Submitters to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade’s inquiry into the Korea-Australia agreement also 
argued that there is an imbalance in the commitments that has the potential to ‘contribute to local 
unemployment’ (p. 4). 
Commentary on the trade benefits of PTAs 
A direct and important benefit from PTAs is the increase in merchandise trade that follows a reduction in tariffs, 
and in some cases a removal of non-tariff barriers (in areas such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and 
customs procedures). Estimating and assessing the extent of this benefit is difficult, as it relies on a number of 
assumptions, and in many cases tariff reductions are phased in over a number of years.  
Estimates are often made of the benefits of an agreement before negotiations are completed. For instance, the 
feasibility study for the China-Australia Trade Agreement was completed in 2005, and the feasibility study for 
the Korea-Australia Trade Agreement was completed in 2008. The content of both agreements were finalised in 
2014. This inevitably means the modelling must rely on assumptions about the final agreement, including how 
tariff barriers are removed. In its 2010 report the Productivity Commission was critical of this approach, noting 
‘A number of the studies have derived “outer envelope” estimates of possible gains by assuming a full coverage 
of goods sectors, a full pass-on of tariff reductions and a full utilisation of concessions … Use of the results of 
these modelling exercises—which typically yield estimates of benefits in the billions of dollars—has inflated 
expectations of the likely economic gains’ (p. xxviii). The Commission concluded that the ‘approach to 
conducting feasibility studies used for most previous Australian [PTAs] has produced overly optimistic 
expectations of the likely economic effects … Such an approach does not provide an adequate basis for assessing 
their merits’ (p. 295). Responding to that criticism in the case of the Korea-Australia agreement, the Government 
commissioned new modelling after the conclusion of negotiations, which predicted that Australia’s total exports 
to Korea are likely to decline by 5 per cent by 2030 if the agreement was not to go ahead. 
In its 2010 report (see particularly Chapter 8, and supplements, the Productivity Commission also examined the 
benefit of PTAs in depth, including both theoretical simulations and ex-post analysis. It noted the potential for 
diversionary trade, where an increase in trade between PTA partners causes a decrease in trade with other 
countries. In examining a number of simulated scenarios, the Commission concluded that for PTAs between two 
small countries, or between Australia and a large economy, a PTA was associated with an overall increase in 
trade, although there was some trade diversion. The report also noted the administrative costs associated with 
PTA rules of origin, and concluded that ‘non-discriminatory trade agreements are more likely to result in net 
trade creation and associated economic benefits than agreements with restrictive preference structures’ 
(p. 145).  
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